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1 Introduction
The first attempt to incorporate information asymmetries in general equilibrium theory
was made by Radner (1968).1 In his model, each agent makes contracts that specify
deliveries which must be constant across states of nature that she cannot distinguish.
This seems to be too restrictive, since the other party may find it to be in his interest to
honor the contract, even if a violation of the contract could be concealed.2
In previous works (Correia-da-Silva and Herve´s-Beloso, 2008, 2009, 2012), we have
introduced the model of an economy with uncertain delivery, where this informational
restriction is relaxed.3 Agents are allowed to make contracts that specify deliveries which
differ across states of nature that they do not distinguish. However, in that case, they
may end up receiving a bundle that was supposed to be delivered in a state of nature
that they cannot distinguish from the one that actually occurred.4
In this paper, we modify our model of general equilibrium with uncertain delivery
(Correia-da-Silva and Herve´s-Beloso, 2012) by opening spot markets in the second pe-
riod, i.e., by allowing agents to retrade after receiving the deliveries associated with the
contracts that they had made in the first period.5
We consider a two-period economy with spot markets in both periods, present and
future, and contingent markets (in the first period) for delivery in the second period.
In the first period, when there is uncertainty about the future state of nature, agents
1See also Yannelis (1991) and the book edited by Glycopantis and Yannelis (2005).
2Such contracts are said to be incentive compatible (Hurwicz, 1972). Allowing agents to make in-
centive compatible contracts, Prescott and Townsend (1984a, 1984b) showed the existence of optimal
allocations and sought to decentralize them through a price system. However, to induce agents to se-
lect incentive compatible contracts, such decentralization may require non-linear prices (Jerez, 2005;
Rustichini and Siconolfi, 2008).
3A related contribution was made by de Castro, Pesce and Yannelis (2011).
4In our framework, the term distinguish refers to the ability to provide evidence that is relevant for
the enforcement of a contract.
5A general equilibrium model of trade with asymmetric information which also features trade ex
ante and ex post was developed by Bisin and Gottardi (1999). Their contribution is worth mentioning,
as their “Hidden Information Economy” addresses related issues, although using a different approach.
In their model, there is a publicly observable aggregate shock and a privately observed idiosyncratic
shock. Agents trade securities that are (only) payable in a numeraire good, and are able to influence the
payoffs of securities through their announcements. Bisin and Gottardi (1999) concluded that existence
of equilibrium requires a minimal form of non-linearity of prices (a bid-ask spread).
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trade in spot markets and in contingent markets. Trade in spot markets determines
present consumption (goods are assumed to be perishable, which means that no storage
is possible). Trade in contingent markets determines the bundle that agents should receive
in each of the possible future states of nature. In the second-period, agents exchange the
bundle that is delivered to them, together with their second-period endowments, for their
second-period consumption bundle.
The difference with respect to the classical model of general equilibrium under un-
certainty (Debreu, 1959, chapter 7) is that agents are assumed to have incomplete and
differential information about the state of nature that occurs in the second period. Each
agent is endowed with a private information structure, described by a partition of the
set of possible states of nature. In the second period, with the objective of enforcing the
delivery contracted in the first period, all that an agent can verify is that the state of
nature belongs to a certain element of her information partition.6
Trade in contingent markets is mediated by competitive insurance firms.7 In the first
period, each agent makes a contract with an insurance firm, stipulating a net trade for
each of the possible future states of nature. In the second period, given the agent’s
incomplete ability to verify the state of nature that has occurred, the firm may have the
opportunity to deliver a less valuable net trade. It may choose among the net trades
contracted for each of the states of nature that the agent cannot distinguish from the one
that actually occurred.8 As a result, the agent receives, in each state of nature, the less
valuable of these net trades (according to the spot prices in that state of nature).
In our model, agents cannot use the information contained in the second-period spot
prices to prove to a third party that a certain state has occurred. This contrasts with
the frameworks of Radner (1979) and Allen (1981). We rule out the use of information
revealed by prices to enforce contracts because it is well known that this would eliminate
the informational asymmetries, rendering the model useless to explain their economic
effects. We assume that even if prices allow an agent to infer the true state of nature,
6While Townsend (1979) studied the effects of costly state-verification, we assume that verification is
free but incomplete. In addition, this incompleteness varies across agents.
7Firms also play the role of intermediaries in the works of Prescott and Townsend (1984a, 1984b),
Jerez (2005), Bisin and Gottardi (2006) and Rustichini and Siconolfi (2008).
8We implicitly assume that, in case of litigation between agent and firm, it is the agent that bears
the burden of proof.
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these inferences are ineffective as a means of enforcing contracts.9
In our framework, a key point is that there are contracts which cannot be enforced
because agents have incomplete information. In this sense, markets are incomplete (in a
different way that in the model introduced by Radner (1972) and developed by Magill
and Quinzii (1996)). Here, agents face endogenous and differential trade possibilities.
We focus on the case in which the number of states of nature is not greater than the
number of goods.10 In this case, we obtain a strong characterization result. Generically
(i.e., in almost all economies) equilibria of the corresponding full information economy
are also equilibria of our private state-verification economy.11 Surprisingly, the incom-
pleteness of private information is irrelevant. Unless the second-period spot prices in
the different states are linearly dependent (which almost never occurs), agents are able
to overcome their incomplete abilities to verify the occurrence of events by selecting an
appropriate bridge portfolio, which guarantees truthful delivery of the desired wealth
transfers across states of nature.
We provide two numerical examples to shed light on the limits of our results. The
first is an example of nonexistence of equilibrium of an asymmetric information economy,
which shows that the above result is only generic. In this example, the single equilibrium
of the corresponding full information economy is not an equilibrium of the asymmetric
information economy. The origin of nonexistence is the following coincidence: if wealth
transfers are allowed, state-contingent prices are parallel (therefore, wealth transfers are
not informationally feasible); if wealth transfers are not allowed, state-contingent prices
are not parallel (therefore, wealth transfers are informationally feasible).
The second example is an equilibrium of an asymmetric information economy which
is not an equilibrium of the corresponding full information economy. In this example,
there exists an equilibrium of the full information economy that is also an equilibrium
9In spite of ruling out the use of information provided by prices to enforce contracts, we will conclude
that (generically) an equilibrium allocation in the full information model is also an equilibrium allocation
in our asymmetric information model. This means that agents do not even need to use the information
revealed by prices. Our result holds if the number of states is not greater than the number of goods.
10More precisely, our conclusions apply to the case in which the maximum number of states in an
agent’s information set is not greater than the number of goods.
11As most genericity results, this characterization requires a differentiability assumption. We assume
that agents’ preferences are well-behaved in the sense of Debreu (1972), which implies that their demand
functions are continously differentiable.
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of the asymmetric information economy. But the asymmetric information economy has
an additional equilibrium, in which state-contingent prices are parallel. The coincidence
behind this second example is similar to the one that underlies the first example. In this
case: if wealth transfers are allowed, state-contingent prices are not parallel (meaning
that wealth transfers are informationally feasible); if wealth transfers are not allowed,
state-contingent prices are parallel (meaning that wealth transfers are not informationally
feasible).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the model of a two-period
economy with private state-verification. In Section 3, we show that, generically, there
exists an equilibrium allocation that is optimal in the sense of Pareto. In Section 4, we
present the two numerical examples. In Section 5, we conclude the paper with some
remarks.
2 The model
In an economy that extends over two time periods, τ = 1 and τ = 2, a finite number of
agents, I = {1, ..., I}, trade contracts for the delivery of a finite number of commodities,
L = {1, ..., L}.
In the first period, agents trade in the presence of uncertainty (but no private infor-
mation) about which of a finite set of possible states of the environment, S = {1, ..., S},
will occur in the second period.
In the second period, each agent receives private information that is described by a
partition of S. If state s ∈ S occurs, agent i ∈ I is only able to prove that the state
of nature belongs to the element of her information partition that contains s, which is
denoted by P i(s).
The initial endowments of each agent i ∈ I are ei = (ei1, ei2) ∈ IRN+ ≡ IRL+ × IRSL+ .
The preferences of each agent i ∈ I about consumption in both periods, xi = (xi1, xi2),
are described by a utility function, U i : IRN+ → IR.
There are spot markets at τ = 1 and at τ = 2, and contingent markets at τ = 1
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for delivery at τ = 2. The deliveries contracted (at τ = 1) in contingent markets are
conditional on the state of nature that occurs (at τ = 2), thus each agent i chooses a
plan of net deliveries, specifying what she should receive in each state of nature, yi =
(yi(1), ..., yi(s), ..., yi(S)) ∈ IRSL.
Prices in spot markets at τ = 1 and τ = 2 are denoted by p1 and p2, respectively, and
prices in contingent markets are denoted by q.
At τ = 1, agent i trades her endowments, ei1, for a consumption bundle, x
i
1 ∈ IRL+, and
a plan of future net deliveries, yi ∈ IRSL. The corresponding budget restriction is:
(
xi1, y
i
) ∈ Bi1 (p1, q) = {(z1, w) ∈ IRN+ : p1 · z1 + q · w ≤ p1 · ei1} .
Trade in contingent markets is mediated by profit-maximizing insurance firms, who
are also price-takers. The relationship between agents and insurers is asymmetric, as it
is the agent that bears the burden of proof. At τ = 2, if state s occurs, agent i can only
prove that the state of nature belongs to P i(s), therefore, the insurers decide which of the
alternatives among {yi(t)}t∈P i(s) is delivered to her. Profit-maximization by the insurers
implies that only the cheapest alternatives, according to p2(s), may be delivered.
Hence, agents receive, in each state s, one of the cheapest bundles among those that
they cannot prove, using only P i(s), that do not correspond to the truthful delivery.12
Accordingly, we can restrict (without loss of generality) the choice of agent i to satisfy
the following restrictions, which induce truthful delivery:13
yi ∈ Di(p2) =
{
z ∈ IRSL : p2(s) · z(s) ≤ p2(s) · z(t), ∀t ∈ P i(s),∀s ∈ S
}
.
At τ = 2, in state s, agent i receives yi(s) (truthful delivery), which she trades, together
with her endowments, ei2(s), for a consumption bundle, x
i
2(s) ∈ IRL+. The corresponding
12See also Correia-da-Silva and Herve´s-Beloso (2008, 2009, 2011) and Correia-da-Silva (2012).
13As we shall verify, since p2 is parallel to q, the choice of y
i /∈ Di(p2) would never be optimal, as
it would lead to the delivery of some zi ∈ Di(p2), cheaper than yi. The agent would be better off by
choosing zi instead of yi.
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budget restriction is:
xi2(s) ∈ Bi2s(p2(s), yi(s)) =
{
z ∈ IRL+ : p2(s) · z ≤ p2(s) ·
[
yi(s) + ei2(s)
]}
.
We normalize prices by imposing that (p1, q) ∈ ∆N and that ‖p2(s)‖ = ‖q(s)‖, for
each s ∈ S.
Let xi = (xi1, y
i, xi2) and p = (p1, q, p2). We write x
i ∈ Bi(p) whenever (xi1, yi) ∈
Bi1(p1, q) and x
i
2(s) ∈ Bi2s(p2(s), yi(s)), ∀s ∈ S.
The choice set of agent i is, therefore:
Ci(p) =
{
xi =
(
xi1, y
i, xi2
) ∈ IRL+ × IRSL × IRSL+ : xi ∈ Bi(p) ∧ yi ∈ Di(p2)} .
In sum, the problem of agent i can be written as:
max
(xi1,yi,xi2)
U i(xi1, x
i
2)
s.t. p1 · xi1 + q · yi ≤ p1 · ei1,
p2(s) · xi2(s) ≤ p2(s) ·
[
yi(s) + ei2(s)
]
, ∀s ∈ S,
p2(s) · yi(s) ≤ p2(s) · yi(t), ∀t ∈ P i(s), ∀s ∈ S.
Or, more compactly, as:
max
xi
U i(xi1, x
i
2) s.t. x
i ∈ Ci(p).
We can assume that the insurance firms behave as a single price-taking agent that
has full information, P f (s) = {s} , ∀s ∈ S, but no endowments, ef = 0. The choice of
the insurer is denoted xf = (xf0 , y
f , xf1) ∈ Bf (p), where the choice set, Bf (p), is defined
as Bi(p) but with null endowments. We assume that it wishes to maximize an objective
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function that is strictly increasing:14
max
xf
U f (xf1 , x
f
2) s.t. x
f ∈ Bf (p).
The demand of the insurer would become unbounded if, for some state s, the relative
prices in spot markets at τ = 2 were different from the relative prices in markets for
contingent delivery in this state. That is, there are arbitrage opportunities unless we
have q(s) = p2(s), for all s ∈ S. If, for every state of nature, the prices in the futures
markets and the prices in the spot markets coincide, the insurer cannot obtain any positive
consumption plan, xf ∈ Bf (p) ⇒ (xf0 , xf1) = 0, and is, therefore, indifferent among any
alternative in its choice set.
Hence, we will restrict our search for equilibrium prices to the following set of no
arbitrage price systems:
P = {(p1, q, p2) ∈ ∆N × IRSL+ : ∀s ∈ S, q(s) = p2(s)} .
And we will suppose that the insurer clears the contingent markets by choosing:
xf =
(
0, yf , 0
)
, with yf = −
∑
i∈I
yi,
which is a trivially optimal choice.
If agents make optimal choices and markets clear, the economy is in equilibrium.
Definition 1 (Equilibrium).
An equilibrium of the asymmetric information economy, E = {ei, U i, P i}i∈I, is a pair
(x∗, p∗), where x∗ = {xi∗}i∈I are individual choices and p∗ ∈ P is a price system that
satisfy:
(i) xi∗ ∈ argmax
z∈Ci(p∗)
U i(z1, z2), ∀i ∈ I [individual optimality];
14Our results do not depend on the actual specification of the objective function. With incomplete
markets, the difficulties in defining an appropriate objective function for a firm are well known. See, for
example, Dre`ze (1985).
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(ii)
∑
i∈I
(
xi∗1 , x
i∗
2
)
=
∑
i∈I
(
ei1, e
i
2
)
[feasibility].
If the correspondences from prices to choice sets, Ci(p), were continuous, it would be
straightforward to establish existence of equilibrium (Debreu, 1952). However, the choice
correspondences are not lower hemicontinuous. This property may fail when prices in
two indistinguished states are collinear (∃s ∈ S, t ∈ Pi(s), k ∈ IR++ : p2(s) = kp2(t)).
In spite of this discontinuity, we will be able to establish generic existence of equilib-
rium in economies where the number of states of nature is not greater than the number
of goods. To show that it is not possible to go beyond the generic existence result, we
will provide an example of an economy in which equilibrium does not exist.
In this kind of differential information economies, the welfare theorems do not neces-
sarily hold. Imperfect information may generate an inefficient allocation of risk-bearing,
because agents may be unable to make the desired wealth transfers across time and states
of nature.
Interestingly, the existence of markets for the future delivery of various goods (as
opposed to contingent claims that are only payable in the numeraire good) generates
additional possibilities for the transference of wealth across states and time. Our main
conclusion will be that, if the number of states of nature is not greater than the number
of goods, then, generically, a complete set of contingent markets allows agents to arrive at
the optimal allocation of risk-bearing, while assets that are only payable in a numeraire
good are not sufficient. This conclusion contrasts with the equivalence result obtained
by Arrow (1953) for the case of public state-verification.
3 Generic existence of an efficient equilibrium
If there were no deliverability restrictions (as in the case of complete state-verification),
the equilibrium allocation would be optimal in the sense of Pareto, since our model
would coincide with the classical general equilibrium model as presented by Debreu (1959,
chapter 7).
On the other hand, in the case in which there is a single good (in each state of nature),
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our model coincides with the model of Radner (1968). In that case, the incompleteness
of state-verification abilities implies efficiency losses and there is only constrained effi-
ciency.15
In this section, we show that if there are at least as many goods as states of na-
ture, then, generically, there is an equilibrium allocation that is optimal in the sense of
Pareto.16 In order to prove this, we proceed in two steps. First, we prove that if the
state-contingent spot price systems are linearly independent, then the agents are able to
attain any consumption plan that is in their budget set (i.e., the deliverability constraints
are not relevant) by choosing an appropriate “bridge portfolio”. Then, we show that in
almost all full information economies, the state-contingent equilibrium price systems are
linearly independent. This allows us to conclude that, generically, the equilibria of a full
information economy are also equilibria of the corresponding economies with asymmetric
information.
Lemma 1 (Wealth transfers).
Consider a vector of strictly positive and linearly independent state-contingent spot price
systems, p2 = (p2(1), ...p2(S)) ∈ IRSL+ , and a vector of desired wealth transfers, w =
(w(1), ...w(S)) ∈ IRS.
If L ≥ S, there exists a portfolio, y = (y(1), ...y(S)) ∈ IRSL, that implements the desired
wealth transfers, p2(s) · y(s) = w(s), ∀s ∈ S, and satisfies the possible deliverability
constraints, p2(s) · y(s) ≤ p2(s) · y(t), ∀s, t ∈ S.
Proof. Let w¯ = max
s∈S
w(s). Observe that there exists a y(s) such that:

p2(1, 1) ... p2(1, L)
... ... ...
p2(s, 1) ... p2(s, L)
... ... ...
p2(S, 1) ... p2(S, L)


y(s, 1)
...
y(s, L)
 =

w¯
...
w(s)
...
w¯

,
15Constrained efficiency means that equilibrium allocations are Pareto-optimal among those that sat-
isfy Radner’s informational restriction (agents must consume the same in states of nature that belong
to the same set of their information partitions).
16Our results apply if the maximum number of states in an agent’s information set is not greater than
the number of goods, i.e., if maxi,s #P
i(s) ≤ L. This condition is always verified if S ≤ L.
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because the number of equations is not greater than the number of variables, S ≤ L, and
the equations are not inconsistent (they could be if the rows of the price matrix were
linearly dependent).
This means that p2(s) · y(s) = w(s) while p2(t) · y(s) = w¯ ≥ w(t), ∀t.
The fact that agents are not informationally restricted in their choice of wealth trans-
fers across time and states of nature implies that their choice set does not depend on
their information, as we show below. The asymmetric information economy is, therefore,
equivalent to a standard Arrow-Debreu economy.
Lemma 2 (Irrelevance of information structures).
Let BiAD(p1, p2) ≡
{
(z1, z2) ∈ IRN : p1 · z1 + p2 · z2 ≤ p1 · ei1 + p2 · ei2
}
.
If L ≥ S and the spot price systems {p2(s)}s∈S are linearly independent, then:
(x1, x2) ∈ BiAD(p1, p2) ⇔ ∃y : (x1, y, x2) ∈ Ci(p).
Proof. Let (x1, x2) ∈ BiAD(p1, p2). For each s ∈ S, calculate w(s) = p2(s) · x2(s) and
obtain y(s) as shown in Lemma 1. By contruction, y ∈ Di(p2). It is also clear that
(x1, y) ∈ Bi1 (p1, p2) and that each x2(s) ∈ Bi2s (p2(s), y(s)).
Let (x1, y, x2) ∈ Ci(p). Since, ∀s ∈ S, p2(s) ·x2(s) ≤ p2(s) · [y(s) + ei2(s)], we conclude
that p2 · x2 ≤ p2 · (y + ei2). Together with p1 · x1 + p2 · y ≤ p1 · ei1, this implies that
(x1, x2) ∈ BiAD(p1, p2).
To study the generic properties of equilibria, we impose further restrictions on the
preferences of the agents by assuming that they are well-behaved in the sense of Debreu
(1972, p. 613).
Assumption 1 (Preferences).
The utility function of each agent i ∈ I satisfies the following properties:
(i) U i : IRN+ → IR is continuous in IRN+ and C2 in IRN++;
(ii) Ri(x) ≡ {z ∈ IRN+ : U i(z) ≥ U i(x)} ⊂ IRN++, ∀x ∈ IRN++;
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(iii) ∀x ∈ IRN++,
(
∂U i(x)
∂x1
, ..., ∂U
i(x)
∂xN
)
 0;
(iv) ∀x ∈ IRN++,
∑N
j=i
∑N
k=1 hjhk
∂2U i(x)
∂xjxk
< 0, for all h ∈ IRN \{0} s.t. ∑Nj=1 hj ∂U i(x)∂xj = 0.
The above assumption was introduced by Debreu (1972) and is widely used (Malin-
vaud, 1972; Allen, 1981; Mas-Colell, 1985; Magill and Quinzii, 1996; Balasko, 2009).17
It implies that the preferences of the agents can be described by demand functions that
are continuously differentiable (Debreu, 1972). Obviously, the resulting aggregate excess
demand function is also continuously differentiable.
It is worth commenting on each of the assumed properties. Point (i) is the differen-
tiability assumption. Point (ii) means that the indifference hypersurfaces are contained
in IRN++, implying that agents choose consumption plans that belong to the interior of
the consumption set. Point (iii) is the assumption of strong monotonicity. Point (iv) im-
poses, besides strict quasi-concavity, that the indifference hypersurfaces have everywhere
a non-zero curvature (which is crucial for the differentiability of the demand function).
We consider a space of Arrow-Debreu economies, E = IRIN+ , in which preferences are
kept fixed and satisfy Assumption 1. In this space, the vector of initial endowments,
e ∈ IRIN+ , completely characterizes an economy. It is well-known that equilibrium exists
as long as the aggregate endowment is strictly positive (eT ≡∑i∈I ei  0).
We want to show that, generically (i.e., in an open and dense subset of E), equilibrium
prices for state-contingent delivery, p2(s) for each s ∈ S, are linearly independent. In
this case, we say that p ∈ P∗.
Lemma 3 (Prices).
There exists an open and dense set of economies, E∗ ⊂ E, for which all equilibrium price
systems belong to p ∈ P∗.
Proof. Let P ′ ⊂ IRN−1 be the open set that is obtained by removing the last coordinate
from the interior of ∆N .
17Debreu (1972) designated the preference relations that satisfy an analogue of Assumption 1 as
well-behaved preferences. The assumption is not too strong, in the sense that any monotone, convex,
continuous and complete preference relation can be approximated by a sequence of preference relations
that are well-behaved (Mas-Colell, 1974).
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The aggregate excess demand function, Z : P ′×E → IRN−1, is defined as the difference
between the sum of the individual demands and the aggregate endowment. Once again,
we omit the last coordinate as it can be obtained from the others using Walras’ Law.
It is known that Z has no critical point. Therefore, by the regular value theorem,
the set M ≡ Z−1(0) is a differentiable manifold of dimension IN (the equilibrium price
manifold).18
Let pr : M → E be the projection of the equilibrium price manifold to the parameter
space. An economy is regular, e ∈ R, if and only if it is a regular value of this projection.
Otherwise, it is a critical economy. It is well-known that the set of critical economies,
C = E \ R, is null (Debreu, 1970).
A price system is a regular equilibrium price system of the economy e ∈ E if and only
if Z(p, e) = 0 and ∂pZ(p, e) has full rank. If an economy is regular, all its equilibrium
price systems are regular (Dierker, 1982).
Therefore, for e ∈ R, we can apply the implicit function theorem to obtain the fol-
lowing result. Given a point of the equilibrium manifold, (p, e) ∈ M , there are open
sets, P ′′ ⊂ P ′ and E ′ ⊂ E , and a C1 function g : E ′ → P ′′ such that g(e) = p and, for
(p′, e′) ∈ P ′′ × E ′, Z(p′, e′) = 0 if and only if g(e′) = p′.
Moreover, ∂g(e) = − [∂pZ(p, e)]−1 ∂eZ(p, e), which implies that ∂g(e) has full rank.
This means that we can move the equilibrium price in any direction by perturbing
the initial endowments. Any neighborhood of (p, e) ∩M contains, therefore, equilibrium
price systems for which the prices in different states are not linearly dependent.
On the other hand, since ∂g(e) has finite values, if p ∈ P∗, then there is a neighborhood
of (p, e) ∩ E in which prices in different states are also linearly independent.
The main result of this section is a straightforward consequence of Lemmas 2 and 3.
Theorem 1 (Optimality).
If L ≥ S, there exists an open and dense set of economies, E∗ ⊂ E, where, ∀e ∈ E∗, the
18See, for example, Balasko (2009, p. 28).
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equilibria of the Arrow-Debreu economy are also equilibria of any economy with the same
endowments and preferences but with differential information.
This surprising result establishes that, if L ≥ S, the information partitions of the
agents are irrelevant. The equilibrium allocation is independent of the information struc-
ture of the economy.
4 Two numerical examples
4.1 An example of nonexistence of equilibrium
Consider an economy with two agents (A and B), two commodities (1 and 2) and two
states of nature (s and t).
Agent A can verify the state of nature that occurs while agent B cannot.
PA = {{s} ; {t}} and PB = {{s, t}} .
The endowments and preferences of the agents are given by:
eA =
[(
eA10, e
A
20
)
;
(
eA1s, e
A
2s
)
;
(
eA1t, e
A
2t
)]
=
[(
1
2
, 1
2
)
; (1, 1) ; (2, 2)
]
,
eB =
[(
eB10, e
B
20
)
;
(
eB1s, e
B
2s
)
;
(
eB1t, e
B
2t
)]
=
[(
3
2
, 3
2
)
; (1, 1) ; (1, 1)
]
,
UA(xA) = 2xA10
1
2 + 2xA20
1
2 + xA1s
1
2 + xA2s
1
2 + xA1t
1
2 + 3
2
xA2t
1
3 ,
UB(xB) = 2xB10
1
2 + 2xB20
1
2 + xB1s
1
2 + xB2s
1
2 +
√
2xB1t
1
2 +
√
2xB2t
1
2 .
Computing the standard Arrow-Debreu equilibrium (i.e., ignoring the informational con-
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straints), we obtain:
p∗ = [(p∗10, p
∗
20) ; (p
∗
1s, p
∗
2s) ; (p
∗
1t, p
∗
2t)] =
[
(1, 1) ;
(
1
2
, 1
2
)
;
(
1
2
, 1
2
)]
,
xA =
[(
xA10, x
A
20
)
;
(
xA1s, x
A
2s
)
;
(
xA1t, x
A
2t
)]
= [(1, 1) ; (1, 1) ; (1, 1)] ,
xB =
[(
xB10, x
B
20
)
;
(
xB1s, x
B
2s
)
;
(
xB1t, x
B
2t
)]
= [(1, 1) ; (1, 1) ; (2, 2)] .
Notice that the wealth transfers required by the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium are not com-
patible with the deliverability constraints. Agent B needs to transfer wealth from the
present to the future state t (precisely: p∗t ·yBt = 1) but not to the future state s (precisely:
p∗s · yBs = 0). However, the collinearity between prices in states s and t implies that agent
B is restricted to transfer the same amount of wealth from the present to the future state
s and to the future state t:{
p∗s · yBs ≤ p∗s · yBt
p∗t · yBt ≤ p∗t · yBs
⇒ p∗s · yBs = p∗t · yBt .
An equilibrium with non-collinear prices in states s and t would have to be an Arrow-
Debreu equilibrium, because the non-collinearity implies that the agents are able to cir-
cumvent the deliverability constraints. Since the single Arrow-Debreu equilibrium (com-
puted above) cannot be an equilibrium of the economy with private state-verification, we
conclude that, if an equilibrium exists, it must be such that prices for delivery in states
s and t are collinear.
The spot prices in state s must be the same for the two goods (p∗1s = p
∗
2s), otherwise,
both agents would demand a higher quantity of the cheapest good while the supply is
the same for the two goods. The same is true for present prices (p∗10 = p
∗
20). Collinearity
between p∗s and p
∗
t implies that candidate equilibrium prices have to be of the form:
p∗ = [(p∗10, p
∗
20) ; (p
∗
1s, p
∗
2s) ; (p
∗
1t, p
∗
2t)] = [(1, 1) ; (a, a) ; (b, b)] .
With these prices in state t, agent B will demand the same quantity of the two goods:
xB1t = x
B
2t. Feasibility, then, implies that x
A
1t = x
A
2t. For these to be optimal choices for
agent A, it is necessary that the marginal rate of substitution between goods 1t and 2t is
equal to 1. This implies that the allocation in state t is the same as in the Arrow-Debreu
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equilibrium:
1
2
xA1t
− 12
1
2
xA2t
− 23
= 1
xA1t = x
A
2t
⇒ (xA1t, xA2t) = (1, 1) ⇒ (xB1t, xB2t) = (2, 2) .
Observe that p∗t · yBt = p∗t · xBt − p∗t · eBt = 2b. Therefore, by the deliverability restrictions,
p∗s ·yBs = 2b, which implies that
(
xB1s, x
B
2s
)
=
(
1 + b
a
, 1 + b
a
)
and
(
xA1s, x
A
2s
)
=
(
1− b
a
, 1− b
a
)
.
Spending in the present is the difference between the value of the present endowments
and the value of the acquired portfolio, p∗0 · xB0 = 3 − 4b. Therefore:
(
xB10, x
B
20
)
=(
3
2
− 2b, 3
2
− 2b) and (xA10, xA20) = (12 + 2b, 12 + 2b).
Since
(
xA10, x
A
20
)
=
(
1
2
+ 2b, 1
2
+ 2b
)
and
(
xA1t, x
A
2t
)
= (1, 1), for the marginal rate of sub-
stitution between goods 10 (or 20) and 1t (or 2t) to equal the ratio between the corre-
sponding prices, we must have b =
√
3+1
4
and
(
xA10, x
A
20
)
=
(
1 +
√
3
2
, 1 +
√
3
2
)
.
For the same reason, we must have:
1
2
xA1s
− 12
1
2
xA1t
− 12
= a
b
xA1t = 1
⇒ (xA1s, xA2s) = ( b2a2 , b2a2) ⇒ (xB1s, xB2s) = (2− b2a2 , 2− b2a2) .
Since
(
xA1s, x
A
2s
)
=
(
1− b
a
, 1− b
a
)
=
(
b2
a2
, b
2
a2
)
, we obtain b
a
=
√
5−1
2
and a = 1+
√
3
2(
√
5−1) .
Summing up, we have:
p∗ = [(p∗10, p
∗
20) ; (p
∗
1s, p
∗
2s) ; (p
∗
1t, p
∗
2t)] =
[
(1, 1) ;
(
1+
√
3
2(
√
5−1) ,
1+
√
3
2(
√
5−1)
)
;
(√
3+1
4
,
√
3+1
4
)]
,
xA =
[(
xA10, x
A
20
)
;
(
xA1s, x
A
2s
)
;
(
xA1t, x
A
2t
)]
=
[(
1 +
√
3
2
, 1 +
√
3
2
)
;
(
3−√5
2
, 3−
√
5
2
)
; (1, 1)
]
,
xB =
[(
xB10, x
B
20
)
;
(
xB1s, x
B
2s
)
;
(
xB1t, x
B
2t
)]
=
[(
1−
√
3
2
, 1−
√
3
2
)
;
(√
5+1
2
,
√
5+1
2
)
; (2, 2)
]
.
In order to see that this single equilibrium candidate is not an equilibrium, notice that
agent B is transferring too much wealth from the present to the future. Agent B cannot
transfer wealth between states s and t, but could attain a higher utility level by spending
more in present consumption and less in its portfolio (transferring wealth from the present
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to both future states s and t):
∂UB/∂xB10
p∗10
= xB10
− 1
2 =
(
2
2−√3
) 1
2 ≈ 2.73,
∂UB/∂xB1s
p∗1s
=
xB1s
− 1
2
2p∗1s
=
√
5−1√
3+1
(
2√
5+1
) 1
2 ≈ 0.36,
∂UB/∂xB1t
p∗1t
=
xB1t
− 1
2
√
2p∗1t
= 2√
3+1
≈ 0.73.
4.2 An example of an inefficient equilibrium
Modify the above economy by changing the endowments of the agents as follows:
eA =
[(
eA10, e
A
20
)
;
(
eA1s, e
A
2s
)
;
(
eA1t, e
A
2t
)]
= [(1, 1) ; (1, 1) ; (1, 1)] ,
eB =
[(
eB10, e
B
20
)
;
(
eB1s, e
B
2s
)
;
(
eB1t, e
B
2t
)]
=
[(
8
3+2
√
2
, 8
3+2
√
2
)
; (2, 2) ; (2, 2)
]
.
The following price system and allocation is an equilibrium of the asymmetric infor-
mation economy:
p∗ = [(p∗10, p
∗
20) ; (p
∗
1s, p
∗
2s) ; (p
∗
1t, p
∗
2t)] =
[
(1, 1) ;
(
1
2
, 1
2
)
;
(
1
2
, 1
2
)]
,
xA =
[(
xA10, x
A
20
)
;
(
xA1s, x
A
2s
)
;
(
xA1t, x
A
2t
)]
= [(1, 1) ; (1, 1) ; (1, 1)] ,
xB =
[(
xB10, x
B
20
)
;
(
xB1s, x
B
2s
)
;
(
xB1t, x
B
2t
)]
=
[(
8
3+2
√
2
, 8
3+2
√
2
)
; (2, 2) ; (2, 2)
]
.
It is straightforward to check that the allocation is feasible (agents are in autarchy)
and that it is individually optimal for the informed agent.19
To check that it is individually optimal for the uninformed agent is slightly more
complicated. Start by calculating the vector of marginal utilities:[
∂UB
∂xB10
,
∂UB
∂xB20
,
∂UB
∂xB1s
,
∂UB
∂xB2s
,
∂UB
∂xB1t
,
∂UB
∂xB2t
]
=
[
1
2
√
2
+ 1
2
, 1
2
√
2
+ 1
2
, 1
2
√
2
, 1
2
√
2
, 1
2
, 1
2
]
.
19The vector of marginal utilities of agent A is
[
∂UA
∂xA10
, ∂U
A
∂xA20
, ∂U
A
∂xA1s
, ∂U
A
∂xA2s
, ∂U
A
∂xA1t
, ∂U
A
∂xA2t
]
=
[
1, 1, 12 ,
1
2 ,
1
2 ,
1
2
]
,
which coincides with the price vector.
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Agent B would clearly like to transfer wealth from state s to state t. However, she is
informationally restricted by the conditions ps · yBs ≤ ps · yBt and pt · yBt ≤ pt · yBt . Since
ps = pt, the two conditions imply that ps · yBs = pt · yBt . This means that agent B must
transfer the same wealth from the present to state s and to state t.
Given this informational restriction, for simplicity of exposition and without loss of
generality, we can restrict agent B to select a portfolio of the form:
[(
yB1s, y
B
2s
)
;
(
yB1t, y
B
2t
)]
= [(Y, 0) ; (Y, 0)] .
Such a portfolio implies an exchange of Y units of wealth in the present for Y
2
units of
wealth in state s and Y
2
units of wealth in state t. Since the marginal utility of wealth in
the present is 1
2
√
2
+ 1
2
and the marginal utility of wealth in states s and t is, respectively,
1√
2
and 1, it is optimal to choose Y = 0. We conclude that the above allocation is
individually optimal for agent B.
We have found an example of an equilibrium of the asymmetric information economy
in which state-contingent prices are parallel, thus preventing the uninformed agent from
transferring wealth between the states. The equilibrium allocation is inefficient.
For this economy, the single Arrow-Debreu equilibrium is the following:
pAD =
[(
pAD10 , p
AD
20
)
;
(
pAD1s , p
AD
2s
)
;
(
pAD1t , p
AD
2t
)] ≈ [(1, 1) ; (0.447, 0.447) ; (0.6758, 0.6658)] ,
xA =
[(
xA10, x
A
20
)
;
(
xA1s, x
A
2s
)
;
(
xA1t, x
A
2t
)] ≈ [(0.811, 0.811) ; (1.0256, 1.0256) ; (1.2906, 1.2384)] ,
xB =
[(
xB10, x
B
20
)
;
(
xB1s, x
B
2s
)
;
(
xB1t, x
B
2t
)] ≈ [(1.5615, 1.5615) ; (1.9745, 1.9745) ; (1.7094, 1.7615)] .
Since state-contingent prices are not parallel, this is also an equilibrium of the asym-
metric information economy.
5 Conclusion
We have introduced an extension of the classical general equilibrium model of trade
under uncertainty (Debreu, 1959, chapter 7) to the case in which agents have incomplete
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and differential abilities to verify the occurence of events. In contrast with our previous
work, we allowed agents to trade ex post. This setup is more realistic because, with
private state-verification, the second-period spot markets are not redundant. In fact, the
combination of contingent markets (that open in the first period) with second-period spot
markets expands the possibilities for wealth transfers across states and time.
In this model, market incompleteness arises endogenously as a consequence of incomplete
state-verification. We have shown that, generically, markets are only incomplete if the
number of states of nature is greater than the number of goods. Otherwise, markets are
actually complete (in spite of incomplete state-verification). Agents are able to induce
truthful delivery of the wealth transfers that they desire by choosing, for delivery in each
state, goods that are relatively cheap in this state but relatively expensive in other states.
This strong and surprising result suggests that the information of the agents (with
information being an exogenously given ability to verify the occurrence of events) is
irrelevant. There is an equilibrium allocation, which is optimal and independent of the
information structure of the economy.
We remark that, despite the fact that the relative prices for future delivery in a given
state coincide with the relative prices in the future spot markets in the same state,
agents do not buy, in contingent markets, the bundles that they wish to consume in
the future (this would render the future spot markets irrelevant). Instead, they select
a “bridge portfolio”, which is not intended for consumption, but to induce the desired
wealth transfers in the absence of complete state-verification.
The optimal allocation cannot, however, be achieved by a system of contingent markets
for the delivery of a numeraire good and spot commodity markets (Arrow, 1953).20 It may
be the case that a complete set of contingent markets allows agents to arrive at an optimal
allocation of risk-bearing, while a system of contingent markets payable in a numeraire
good and commodity markets does not. If agents have incomplete abilities to verify the
occurrence of relevant events, what was a redundancy in the ways of transferring wealth
across states becomes useful as a means of enforcing truthful deliveries.
20In a seminal work, Arrow (1953) showed that an optimal allocation of risk-bearing can be achieved
by such a system of markets. Relatively to a system of complete contingent markets, the former permits
economizing on markets. Only L + S + L markets (where S is the number of states of nature, and L is
the number of commodities) are needed, instead of a complete set of markets for contingent claims on
commodities, which totals a number of L + SL markets.
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